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THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON
BANGLADESH’S READY-MADE
GARMENT INDUSTRY: THE HIGH COST
OF CHEAP CLOTHING
INTRODUCTION
lobalization and the rise of multinational corporations
have significantly transformed the world’s labor and pro-
duction markets.1 To retain a competitive advantage, many mul-
tinationals have relocated their manufacturing facilities to de-
veloping nations in order to utilize the availability of cheap,
abundant labor, which remains relatively unprotected by gov-
ernmental regulation or organization.2 This trend has been par-
ticularly apparent in the ready-made garment (“RMG”) indus-
try, where rapidly changing fashion trends and the mechaniza-
tion-resistant nature of fabric render apparel manufacturers ex-
ceptionally reliant on human labor.3 As a result, multinationals,
and the industrialized nations in which they are based, have ac-
tively participated in the globalization of this sector.4
Public concern regarding labor conditions under which these
garments are made has increased alongside globalization.5 In re-
cent years, the RMG industry has faced heightened interna-
tional scrutiny due to allegations of sweatshop practices, unsafe
working conditions, unlivable wages, unreasonable hours, lethal
accidents, and both physical and mental abuses by supervisors
in developing nations around the world.6 In April, 2013, the
1. Maria Gillen, The Apparel Industry Partnership’s Free Labor Associa-
tion: A Solution to the Overseas Sweatshop Problem or the Emperor’s New
Clothes?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1059, 1059–60 (2000).
2. Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE APPAREL
INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD
LABOR PROBLEM?, 15, 22 (1996) [hereinafter APPARELCODES OFCONDUCT]; Gil-
len, supra note 1, at 1059.
3. Michael Piore, The Economics of the Sweatshop, in NO SWEAT: FASHION,
FREETRADE, AND THERIGHTS OFGARMENTWORKERS 135, 138 (Andrew Ross ed.,
9, 1997).
4. APPAREL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 2, at ii.
5. Id. at 22.
6. Though beyond the scope of this Note, issues of child labor, trafficking,
and exploitation in Bangladesh are sadly prevalent. The U.S. Department of
Labor found as follows:
G
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death of 1,133 workers when the Rana Plaza RMG factory
(“Rana Plaza”) in Bangladesh collapsed marked what has been
called the worst tragedy in the industry’s history—and sparked
significant international mainstream media attention.7
Bangladesh, bordered on three sides by India, is located on the
northern edge of the Bay of Bengal and shares a short border
with Burma. 8 Approximately 155 million people now live in
Bangladesh’s 55,598 square miles.9 As the eighth most populous
In 2012, Bangladesh made a moderate advancement in its efforts to
eliminate the worst forms of child labor. The Government passed the
Human Trafficking Deterrence and Suppression Act, which criminal-
izes trafficking. The Government also approved the Child Labor Elim-
ination National Plan of Action (NPA). Over the reporting period the
Government began a new initiative to eliminate child labor from ur-
ban slums and in rural areas. However, legal protections regarding
child labor are limited, and the capacity to enforce child labor laws
remains weak. Children in Bangladesh continue to engage in the
worst forms of child labor, particularly in dangerous activities in ag-
riculture and in domestic service.
BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, Bangladesh 2012 Findings on the Worst
Forms of Child Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/re-
ports/child-labor/bangladesh.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (emphasis
added). See also Jane C. Hong, Enforcement of Corporate Codes of Conduct:
Finding a Private Right of Action for International Laborers Against MNCS for
Labor Rights Violations, 19WIS. INT’LL.J. 41 (2000); Ryan P. Toftoy,Now Play-
ing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater. Is Nike Just Doing It?,
15 ARIZ. J. INT’L&COMP. L. 905, 909 (1998).
7. Google’s “Google Trends” tool shows that the term “Bangladesh Factory”
was searched on the internet at a level of five in March, 2012, and reached its
peak at over 100 in May, 2013 (“Bangladesh Garment Factory” yielded 0 and
100 respectively). To utilize this tool see Google Trends, GOOGLE.COM,
http://www.google.com/trends/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014); see also Barney Jop-
son, US and European Retailers Split on Bangladesh Factory Safety Plans,
FINANCIAL TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b36129e8-e983-
11e2-bf03-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2e38tqdKB; BOF Team, Unfilled Rana
Plaza Fund Exposes Fashion’s Lack of Accountability, BUS. OF FASHION (Aug.
19, 2014), http://www.businessoffashion.com/2014/08/unfilled-rana-plaza-
fund-exposes-fashions-lack-accountability.html?utm_source=Subscrib-
ers&utm_campaign=c512a8e0b0-&utm_me-
dium=email&utm_term=0_d2191372b3-c512a8e0b0-416978493.
8. See generallyU.S. DEP’T OFSTATE - BUREAU OFCONSULARAFFAIRS,Bang-
ladesh, U.S. PASSPORT & INT’L TRAVEL, http://travel.state.gov/content/pass-
ports/english/country/bangladesh.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter Bangladesh].
9. Id.
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nation in the world, it is also the most crowded, ranking first in
population density.10
About four million people currently work in Bangladesh’s
RMG industry—the world’s second largest apparel exporter fol-
lowing China. 11 While apparel made in Bangladesh only ac-
counts for about 6 percent of America’s apparel imports,12 the
United States is currently Bangladesh’s top single trading part-
ner, accounting for almost 25 percent of its total exports. 13 De-
spite the collapse of Rana Plaza and the catastrophe’s revelation
of Bangladesh’s extensive industrial safety problems, the indus-
try saw a 16 percent rise in exports to US$23.9 billion from the
time of the collapse to March 2014.14
In direct response to the collapse, various groups of retailers
that sourced from Bangladeshi factories announced plans to im-
prove factory safety in hopes to avoid such fatal events in the
future.15 Due to the United States’ unique position as a major
buyer in Bangladesh’s RMG market, however, the government
must take a proactive stand by adopting socially conscious
guidelines and regulations that will substantially improve fac-
tory safety. This Note will examine what has been done to im-
prove factory conditions in Bangladesh, as well as what must be
10. Id. (Not counting “some city states and tiny island nations.”).
11. Ruma Paul and Serajul Quadir, Bangladesh Urges No Harsh EU
Measures Over Factory Deaths, REUTERS (May 4, 2013), http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/2013/05/04/us-bangladesh-factory-idUSBRE94304420130504.
12. Major Shippers Report U.S. General Imports By Category, 9/2014 Data,
INT’L TRADE ADMIN.: OFFICE OF TEXTILES AND APPAREL (OTEXA),
http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/msr/catV1.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
13. Steven Greenhouse and Stephanie Clifford,U.S. Retailers Offer Plan for
Safety at Factories, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/07/11/business/global/us-retailers-offer-safety-plan-for-bang-
ladeshi-factories.html?pagewanted=all; Paul and Quadir, supra note 11.
14. Alex Magdaleno, Bangladesh Charges 18 People in Connection with
Deadly Factory Collapse, MASHABLE (July 16, 2014), http://masha-
ble.com/2014/07/16/rana-plaza-charges-bangladesh/; Surman Saha, Garment
Exports Show Resilience, DAILY STAR (April 23, 2014),
http://www.thedailystar.net/garment-exports-show-resilience-21162.
15. Shelly Banjo and Suzanne Kapner, U.S. Retailers to Implement Bangla-
desh Factory Plan, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/ar-
ticles/SB10001424127887323423804579023640207379578; Steven Green-
house, Europeans Fault American Safety Effort in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/business/interna-
tional/europeans-fault-american-safety-effort-in-bangladesh.html?ref=inter-
national.
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accomplished, in order to fully address and correct lingering
safety concerns. Part I will examine the development of interna-
tional RMG trade and its sources, as well as the history and in-
terplay between the American and Bangladeshi RMG indus-
tries. Part II will uncover the harm that this relationship has
caused over time, putting particular emphasis on the figurative
high cost of literal cheap clothing by studying two recent and
deadly events in depth. Part III will examine the inherent flaws
and inadequacies of the procedures currently in place to regulate
workplace safety both domestically, within Bangladesh, and in-
ternationally, in other nations. Finally, Part IV will address the
responsibility of U.S. lawmakers to raise labor standards in
Bangladesh, and recommend an approach comprised of three
separate, yet interrelated steps. First, the U.S. government,
along with labor advocacy groups, must develop campaigns to
educate, persuade, and convince American consumers to pres-
sure brands to raise their labor standards. Second, the U.S. gov-
ernment must bolster these campaigns by developing an easily
implemented system that utilizes standard American intellec-
tual property law, via certification trademarks, to provide con-
sumers with a trustworthy and reliable guarantee that compli-
ant products are made clearly visible and available for public
purchase. Third, and finally, the U.S. government must pass leg-
islation that prohibits goods from entering the country if they
are made under unacceptable conditions, (i.e., without proper
certification). In its entirety, this proposal seeks to remove blood-
stained clothes from the American marketplace, and thus signal
to the world that steps must be taken to protect Bangladeshi
RMG factory workers.
I: AN INTERNATIONALHISTORY OF THE RMG INDUSTRY.
This section will examine the development of international
RMG sourcing and trade. It will also observe the history and in-
terplay between the U.S. and Bangladeshi RMG industries,
showing how Bangladesh secured its place as a leading producer
of RMGs, despite setbacks, and remains a vital source of RMGs
throughout the world.
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A. How the United States Expanded into the International
RMG Market.
The United States is currently the world’s largest importer of
merchandise.16 American-funded garment and apparel produc-
tion is now part of a worldwide industry that has changed dra-
matically over the last fifty years.17Historically, American cloth-
ing companies manufactured the majority of their garments do-
mestically.18 In the late 1950s, only one out of twenty-five gar-
ments purchased in the United States was produced abroad.19
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, manufacturers began
moving their operations outside of the United States.20 Since
competition revolved mainly around maintaining a low price
point, the search for profit led many companies to the low wages
and developing economies of Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong
Kong.21 These newly industrialized nations allowed for more
open economic policies and enjoyed a highly disciplined, yet un-
organized, workforce that could produce the same quality goods
at a mere fraction of the price.22 In addition to labor incentives,
factors like fleeting trend and product life cycles, unpredictable
and fluctuating consumer demands, an abundance of product op-
tions, and increasingly complex supply chains continued to
16. International Trade Statistics 2012, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2012_e/its12_merch_trade_prod-
uct_e.pdf; Country Profiles: United States, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/US_e.htm.
17. Dennis Hayashi, Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment
Industry: A Proposed Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 YALE J.
INT’L L. 195, 196–97 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
18. Samantha C. Halem, Slaves to Fashion: A Thirteenth Amendment Liti-
gation Strategy to Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry, 36 SANDIEGO
L. REV. 397, 408 (1999).
19. Holly R. Winefsky and Julie A. Tenney, Preserving the Garment Indus-
try Proviso: Protecting Acceptable Working Conditions Within the Apparel and
Accessories Industries, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 587, 612 (2002).
20. Id.
21. Kabeer, Naila and Simeen Mahmud, Rags, Riches and Women Workers:
Export-oriented Garment Manufacturing in Bangladesh, in CHAINS OF
FORTUNE: LINKING WOMEN PRODUCERS AND WORKERS WITH GLOBAL MARKETS
135 (Commonwealth Secretariat, ed., 2004), available at
http://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/files/publications/files/Kabeer-Mahmud-Ex-
port-Oriented-Garment-Bangladesh.pdf.
22. Id.
284 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:1
transform the industry on a global scale.23 With the goal of tak-
ing
co-operative and constructive action, within a multilateral
framework, so as to deal with the situation in such a way as to
promote on a sound basis the development of production and
expansion of trade in textile products and progressively to
achieve the reduction of trade barriers and the liberalization of
world trade in these products,24
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)25 established the Mul-
tifibre Agreement (“MFA”) among participating countries in
1974.26 During a period when protective barriers were actually
being disassembled in other areas of trade, the MFA guaranteed
that RMG trade remained decidedly regulated.27 The MFA im-
posed quotas, or quantitative restrictions, on the volume of ex-
ports from any country that grew at a rate higher than levels
established bilaterally.28 The MFA, however, did not necessarily
achieve this goal, as the imposition of quotas merely opened the
door to the development of clever ways to bypass and undermine
these restrictions, which quickly brought Bangladeshi garments
to doorsteps all over the world.29
23. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Spotlight on Statistics: Fashion, UNITED
STATESDEPARTMENTOFLABOR, http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/fashion/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2013).
24. Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (Multifibre Agree-
ment), Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, 1974 WL 166593 (entered into force Apr.
1, 1974).
25. The World Trade Organization is the only global international organi-
zation that deals with the rules of trade between nations. The WTO’s main
rulemaking output is its agreements, which are negotiated and signed by the
bulk of the world’s trading nations, and ratified in their parliaments. The goal
of these agreements is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and
importers conduct their business. See What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
26. Textiles Monitoring Body: The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm#MFA (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally Bangladesh | Background, FSG, http://www.fsg.org/Por-
tals/0/Uploads/Documents/PDF/Bangladesh.pdf?cpgn=WP%20DL%20-
%20Smallholder%20Donor%20 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014); see also Kabeer,
Naila and Mahmud, supra note 21 at 136; see also BANGLADESH: A COUNTRY
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B. The Emergence of Bangladesh in the International RMG
Market.
As an indirect result of the MFA, the first garment factories in
Bangladesh aimed at the international export markets were
opened in the late 1970s by investors from other, more devel-
oped, Asian nations like South Korea, whose exports had been
restrained by quotas imposed by importing nations such as the
United States.30 These foreign investors benefitted from even
lower labor costs than those in their home countries, which offset
the added costs of importing all materials to less developed na-
tions, like Bangladesh, that were not privy to the quota re-
straints.31 During this process, investors would provide Bangla-
deshis with virtually free training and modern equipment in re-
turn for extraordinarily cheap labor.32 Due to these sub-contrac-
tor relationships, business quickly flourished, and Bangladesh
became a more substantial supplier—albeit as a middleman—to
the U.S. market.33 Soon thereafter, Bangladeshi capitalists saw
independent opportunities and began to organize their own
manufacturing plants in places like Dhaka, Chittagong, and
other smaller Bangladeshi towns, where basic garments were
cut, assembled, packed, and shipped to customers overseas.34
By the mid-1980s, the RMG industry had become a very strong
export earner in Bangladesh.35 At this time, up to 65 percent of
American garments were produced abroad and imported.36 Be-
tween 1985 and 1995, American imports of apparel grew by 171
percent, reaching nearly US$34.7 billion.37 By that time, the
United States imported apparel products from 168 countries—
STUDY (James Heitzman and Robert Worden eds., 1989) [hereinafter Heitzman
and Worden].
30. Heitzman and Worden, supra note 29; History of the Desh Group, DESH
GROUP, http://www.deshgroup.com/html/corporate.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2014) (“Desh Garments Ltd. (established 27th December 1977) was the first
export oriented ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh. It was set-up in
joint venture with Daewoo of South Korea. At its time of inception, Desh was
the single largest and most modern garment-manufacturing unit in the sub-
continent.”).
31. Heitzman and Worden, supra note 29.
32. Kabeer, Naila and Mahmud, supra note 21, at 136.
33. Heitzman and Worden, supra note 29.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Hayashi, supra note 17, at 196–97.
37. APPAREL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 2, at ii.
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including Bangladesh.38 During that ten-year span, U.S. RMG
imports from Bangladesh jumped from US$126 million in 1985
to US$1.067 billion in 1995.39
C. Bangladesh Secures its Place in the International RMG Mar-
ket.
The quota system that made Bangladesh a world-wide pro-
ducer, however, expired in 2004.40 While the MFA had previ-
ously provided Bangladesh with a relatively fixed market share,
its expiration created the opportunity for ruinous competition,
especially from China. 41 Many predicted that the demise of
Bangladesh’s RMG industry was near.42 Instead of losing its
foothold in the world’s marketplace, however, Bangladeshi RMG
exports rose significantly and actually decreased the export gap
38. Nurul Momen, Implementation of Privatization Policy: Lessons from
Bangladesh, 12(2) INNOVATION J.: PUB. SECTOR INNOVATION J. 4 (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.innovation.cc/scholarly-style/momen_privatization4e.pdf.
Between 1975 and 1981, a number of important changes in the poli-
cies and institutions were introduced (i.e. declaration of Industrial In-
vestment Schedule 1976, withdrawal of the private investment ceiling
in 1978, etc.) to broaden the scope for private sector participation in
the industrialization process. The major elements in the policy to
bring about a decisive shift toward a private sector-driven industrial-
ization during this period included: (i) elimination of ceiling on private
investment, (ii) reduction in the reserve list of industries under the
public sector and creation of “free sectors”, (iii) relaxation of invest-
ment sanctioning procedures, (iv) amendment of the Constitution to
allow disinvestment and denationalization of both abandoned and
taken-over industries, (v) establishment of a Disinvestment Board in
1975, (vi) reopening of the stock market, (vii) shift to a floating ex-
change rate, and (viii) introduction of various export promotion
measures.
Id.; see also APPAREL CODES OF CONDUCT , supra note 2, at 230.
39. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Major Shippers Report, OFFICE OF TEXTILES
AND APPAREL, http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov/msrpoint.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2014).
40. John Chalmers, Special Report: How textile kings weave a hold in Bang-
ladesh, REUTERS (May 2, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-
bangladesh-garments-special-report-idUSBRE9411CX20130502; Mahtab
Haider, Defying predictions, Bangladesh’s garment factories thrive, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCEMONITOR (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0207/p04s02-
wosc.html.
41. Chalmers, supra note 40.
42. Haider, supra note 40.
2014] READY-MADE GARMENT INDUSTRY 287
with China.43 As labor shortages, wage inflations, and a shift to
luxury products developed, China became a less attractive
source for garments.44 Bangladesh, in contrast, continued to of-
fer highly skilled yet exceptionally cheap labor.45 Buyers contin-
ued sourcing from Bangladesh since retailers remained unwill-
ing to pass any retail price increases to often unknowing custom-
ers.46 There was simply no substitute for Bangladesh, “where
manufacturers even risk[ed] operating from rickety structures
to cap costs.”47
By 2005, RMG production had grown into a multi-billion-dol-
lar manufacturing and export industry in Bangladesh, account-
ing for 75 percent of the country’s earnings that year.48 With
practically no government regulation, the RMG industry in
Bangladesh continued to expand.49 Consequently, U.S. RMG im-
ports from Bangladesh also increased steadily, totaling
US$2.371 billion in 2005, US$3.930 billion in 2010 and most re-
cently US$4.894 billion as of July 2014.50 The number of facto-
ries in Bangladesh also grew—though only 134 factories existed
in 1983, this number grew to 2,353 by 1995 and is around 5,700
43. Chalmers, supra note 40.
44. Id.
45. Haider, supra note 40.
46. Anupama Chandrasekaran, For Cost-crunching Retailers, Bangladesh
Reigns Supreme, REUTERS (July 9, 2013), http://in.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2013/07/09/bangladesh-garments-alternatives-idINDEE9680FY20130709.
47. Id.
48. Mohammed Ziaul Haider, Competitiveness of the Bangladesh Ready-
made Garment Industry in Major International Markets, 3 ASIA-PAC. TRADE
INVESTMENT REV. 3, 6 (2007).
49.
It is often argued in the context of Bangladesh that unlimited political
maneuvering has directly contributed to the public sector’s chronic in-
efficiencies, huge financial losses and rampant corruption over the
years. One of the principal reasons for privatizing public enterprises
in Bangladesh is to reduce the fiscal burden that their losses and their
subsidization impose on the state.
Momen, supra note 38 at 1; See also Heitzman and Worden, supra note 29.
50. Major Shippers Report, supra note 39.
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currently.51 About four million people now work in these facto-
ries,52 providing the labor to cement Bangladesh’s status as the
world’s second-largest apparel exporter after China. 53 RMGs
now make up 80 percent of Bangladeshi annual exports, com-
pared to less than 4 percent in 1984.54 In the United States, spe-
cifically, Bangladesh is now the fourth largest garment and ap-
parel importer, closely following Indonesia, Vietnam, and
China.55 This steady incline is noteworthy, as it corresponds
with the United States’ building interest in the Bangladeshi
RMG market.
D. The Modern U.S. and Bangladeshi Partnership in the RMG
Market.
While products made in Bangladesh only account for approxi-
mately 6 percent of America’s apparel imports, 56 the United
States is currently Bangladesh’s top single trading partner, ac-
counting for almost 25 percent of its total exports. 57 Last year,
the United States imported over US$76 billion in apparel.58 Cur-
rently, more than 97 percent of clothes and shoes sold in the
51. BGMEA at a Glance, BANGLADESH GARMENT MANUFACTURERS AND
EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION (BGMEA)
http://www.bgmea.com.bd/home/pages/aboutus#.Uk2siGTXg0M (last visited
Sept. 7, 2014).
52. Achim Berg, Saskia Hedrich, and Thomas Tochtermann, Bangladesh:
The Next Hot Spot in Apparel Sourcing?: Lower Costs are an Advantage for the
Country’s Ready-Made-Garment Industry, but Challenges Remain, MCKINSEY
&COMPANY (Mar. 2012), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/consumer_and_re-
tail/bangladesh_the_next_hot_spot_in_apparel_sourcing; BGMEA at a Glance,
supra note 51.
53. Paul and Quadir, supra note 11; Md. Mazedul Islam, Adnan Maroof
Khan andMd. Monirul Islam, Textile Industries in Bangladesh and Challenges
of Growth, 2(2) RES. J. ENGINEERING SCI. 31, 31 (2013), available at
http://www.isca.in/IJES/Archive/v2i2/7.ISCA-RJEngS-2013-002.pdf.
54. Farid Ahmed, Bangladesh Court Orders Arrest of Apparel Factory
Owner, Five Others, CNN (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/31/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-arrest-orders/;
Trade Information, BANGLADESH GARMENT MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORTERS
ASS’N, http://bgmea.com.bd/home/pages/TradeInformation#.Utr80GQo6u4
(last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
55. Major Shippers Report, supra note 12.
56. Id.
57. Greenhouse and Clifford, supra note 13.
58. Major Shippers Report, supra note 12.
2014] READY-MADE GARMENT INDUSTRY 289
United States are made abroad.59 As a result, the entire process
has become highly integrated and numerous workers in different
locations contribute to the final product.60 Therefore, the custom
of subcontracting has deep historical roots in the RMG indus-
try.61 Under the subcontractor system, there is a disconnect be-
tween workers and the company for which the work is done.62
While companies are still responsible for the creative design and
distribution of their final products, it is typical to ship the raw
materials to a factory that is not owned by the company for man-
ufacturing.63 Companies prefer this because they can take ad-
vantage of the presumption that they are not liable for wage and
labor violations in their contractors’ shops.64 Thus, these partic-
ular market forces create a motivation and readiness by RMG
contractors and manufacturers to break labor laws.65 For exam-
ple, recent reports in Bangladesh allege workers frequently
working nineteen and a half hour days—a clear labor violation.66
As a result, the relationship between subcontracting and
sweatshops is understandably inseparable.67Workers unfortu-
nately “bear the brunt” of arduous workloads, low wages, uncom-
pensated-yet-forced overtime, and dangerous workplaces as
manufacturers attempt to avoid liability and shift responsibility
for labor standards onto their contractors. 68This arrangement
results in consumers’ ignorance of the truths that are sewed into
59. AAFA Releases Apparel Stats 2012 Report, AMERICAN APPAREL &
FOOTWEARASS’N (Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.wewear.org/aafa-releases-appar-
elstats-2012-report/.
60. Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 19, at 612.
61. Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing A
Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 299–300
(2003).
62. Id.
63. Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 19, at 608.
64. Hayashi, supra note 17, at 199.
65. Lung, supra note 61, at 299–300.
66. Richard Bilton, Bangladeshi Factory Workers Locked in on 19-hour
Shifts, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
24195441 (Describing BBC’s September, 2013, secret filming of the Ha Meem
Sportswear factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh, that had experienced a fire a few
weeks prior. Undercover reporters interviewed a worker alleging that he
worked shifts from 7:00am to 2:30am. “My feelings are bad and my health is
too,” he says, “In the last two weeks, approximately, it has been like this for
eight nights.”).
67. Lung, supra note 61, at 299–300.
68. Id.
290 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:1
the very garments that clothe them.69 The evolution of this pro-
cess, as well as its current formation, highlights the uncertainty
of where liability may fall when things go wrong.
II: THEHARMFUL EFFECTS OF THEU.S. AND BANGLADESHI
PARTNERSHIP IN THE RMGMARKET.
In an ideal world, the aforementioned trends in global markets
would have minimal negative consequences. Reality, however, is
not so idyllic. Bangladesh’s safety record is far from clean,70 and
the United States alone is responsible for purchasing around 25
percent of Bangladesh’s annual exports.71 Since 2005, over 1,800
workers have died in Bangladesh’s RMG industry due to pre-
ventable building collapses and factory fires.72 This section in-
cludes examinations of two recent, and lethal, incidents that will
illuminate the issues afflicting the industry:
69. Alison A. Gormley, The Underground Exposed: The United States Cor-
porations’ Use of Sweatshops Abroad, and the Abuse of Women, 25 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 109, 119 (2001).
70. While reliable death toll records are nearly impossible to find for the
1980’s and 1990’s, a more recent sampling—excluding the two incidents dis-
cussed in depth below—is as follows: Via fires: forty-six killed at Chowdhury
Knitwear & Garments Factory in Narshingdi on November 25, 2000; twenty-
four killed at Maico Sweeter Factory in Mirpur, Dhaka on August 8, 2001;
twenty-two killed at Shan Knitting and Processing Ltd. in Narayanganj on
January 6, 2005; fifty-four killed at KTS Garment Factory in Chittagong on
February 23, 2006; twenty-six killed at Ha-Meem Group Factory in Ashulia,
Dhaka on December 14, 2010; eight killed in Dhaka in May 2013, ten killed at
Aswad Garment Factory in Gazipur on October 8, 2013. Via factory collapse:
seventy killed in Dhaka in 2005, fourteen died and twenty-five were injured
when another high-rise building, owned by a government official, collapsed on
tin-roof shanties in June 2010. See Arun Devnath, Death Trap, DAILY STAR
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-de-
tails.php?nid=258930; Serajul Quadir and Ruma Paul, Bangladesh Factory
Fire Kills 8; Collapse Toll Tops 900, REUTERS (May 9, 2013), http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/2013/05/09/us-bangladesh-fire-
idUSBRE94801T20130509?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews; 80 Dead,
800 Hurt in Savar High-rise Collapse, BD NEWS (April 24, 2013),
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/24/rana-plaza-collapse-32-dead;
Bangladesh Garment Factory Fire Kills 10 People, ABC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/bangladesh-garment-factory-
fire-kills-20506935.
71. Greenhouse and Clifford, supra note 13.
72. Arun Devnath and Refayet Ullah Mirdha, US Suspends GSP for Bang-
ladesh, DAILY STAR (June 28, 2013), http://ar-
chive.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/us-set-to-suspend-bangladeshs-gsp/.
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A. The Tazreen Fashion Factory Fire
When the Tazreen Fashion factory in the Bangladeshi capital,
Dhaka, burned, it injured 200 and killed at least 112 of its over
1,00073 daily workers during the night of November 24, 201274—
while as many as 600 workers were still inside the factory work-
ing overtime.75 At the time, the factory was producing clothes for
Wal-Mart, Sears, Walt Disney, Co., and other major, multina-
tional RMG retailers.76 A survey of the debris after the fire was
contained uncovered children’s shorts with Wal-Mart’s Faded
Glory labels, sweatshirts decorated with Disney cartoons, and
shorts with hip-hop artist Sean (“Puff Daddy”) Combs’ ENYCE
tag, along with sweaters from the French company Teddy Smith
and the Scottish company Edinburgh Woollen Mill.77
The fire began in an illegal warehouse on the ground floor of
the factory, which was used to store flammable yarn near elec-
tric generators, and rapidly spread upward through the remain-
ing eight floors.78 There were no ceiling sprinklers79 and insuffi-
cient fire defense materials throughout the building.80 The over-
crowded factory had only three narrow staircases.81 Workers de-
scending the stairs were blinded by darkness, as there was no
backup source of electricity in the factory.82 Iron bars blocked the
73. Vikas Bajaj, Fatal Fire in Bangladesh Highlights the Dangers Facing
Garment Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/11/26/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-kills-more-than-100-and-in-
jures-many.html?_r=0.
74. Dhaka Bangladesh Clothes Factory Fire Kills More than 100, BBCNEWS
ASIA (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20482273.
75. Bajaj, supra note 73.
76. Julhas Alam, Factory Owner: I Didn’t Know Fire Exits Needed,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 29, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-exclusive-
disney-sears-used-factory-fire-0.
77. Id.
78. Bajaj, supra note 73; Jim Yardly, Horrific Fire Revealed a Gap in Safety
for Global Brands, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/12/07/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-exposes-safety-gap-in-sup-
ply-chain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
79. Yardly, supra note 78.
80. AIN O SALISH KENDRA, INVESTIGATION UNIT, GARMENT FACTORY FIRE, 3
(Nov. 24, 2012), available at http://www.askbd.org/web/wp-content/up-
loads/2012/11/ASK%20Investigation%20Report%20-
%20Garments%20Factory%20Fire%20-%2024%20November%2020121.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Bajaj, supra note 73.
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windows.83 The top three floors were under construction at the
time and padlocked, making escaping to the roof impossible.84
All of the stairways led to the flaming warehouse on the ground
floor.85 Most of the victims were found on the ground and second
floors and were killed because there were no emergency exits.86
Most victims were women.87 Most of the bodies were burned be-
yond recognition.88
Rather than leading exit strategies to minimize the death toll,
managers told workers to ignore the fire alarms, calling it a
mock fire drill,89 and return to work.90 Nine mid-level officials
were actually accused of padlocking exits and preventing work-
ers from leaving the building.91 The main gate, the only entry
and exit point of the factory, was found locked just after the fire
began, exposing the fleeing workers to excruciating smoke inha-
lation and suffocation. 92 Life-threatening practices such as
blocking factory exits are common and often hidden under the
cover of night.93
83. Yardly, supra note 78.
84. Arun Devnath, Death Trap, DAILY STAR (Nov. 27, 2012), http://ar-
chive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=258930.
85. Id.
86. Bajaj, supra note 73.
87. Farid Ahmed, Panel Calls Bangladesh Factory Fire Sabotage, Says
Owner Should be Tried, CNN (Dec. 18, 2012), http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2012/12/17/world/asia/bangladesh-factory-fire/index.html.
88. Bajaj, supra note 73.
89. Ahmed, supra note 87.
90. Wal-Mart says Bangladesh Garment Factory Where Fire Killed 112 Was
No Longer Authorized to Make Its Clothing, N.Y. DAILYNEWS (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/bangladesh-fire-factory-high-risk-
article-1.1208041.
91. Bangladesh Tazreen Factory Fire Was Sabotage –Inquiry, BBC NEWS
ASIA (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20755952.
92. Sabotage, Really?, DAILY STAR (Dec. 19, 2012), http://ar-
chive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=261703.
93. Richard Bilton, Bangladeshi Factory Workers Locked in on 19-hour
Shifts, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
24195441 (Describing BBC’s September, 2013, secret filming of the Ha Meem
Sportswear factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh, that had experienced a fire a few
weeks prior. The footage shows a guard locking a main factory gate at 1:15am
leaving dozens of workers, who had begun shifts at 7:00am, inside and notes,
“If anything goes wrong tonight, the workers are trapped inside.” Two days
later, the undercover investigator asked the factory manager if the gates were
ever locked, to which he replied that they were always left open.).
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While initial reports suspected an electrical short circuit
caused the disaster, 94 the Bangladeshi government issued a
highly criticized95 statement deeming it an “act of sabotage” by
an undetermined party and gross negligence on behalf of the fac-
tory owner, Delwar Hossain.96 The Tazreen factory was just one
of a dozen owned by Hossain at the time.97 Hossain claimed he
was never informed that the facility was required to have an
emergency exit,98 showing how far removed the control within
Bangladesh’s RMG industry was from important—and arguably
commonsensical—issues of basic worker safety.99
Additionally, the fact that Wal-Mart had previously flagged
the factory for “violations and/or conditions which were deemed
to be high risk” in May, 2011, via a safety audit—yet continued
to do business there—further illuminates the immensity of the
problem.100 An additional inspection a few months later in De-
cember, 2011, by NTD Apparel Inc., a Canadian company that
supplied Wal-Mart, revealed that Tazreen had “inaccessible/in-
sufficient firefighting equipment,” an “inadequate evacuation
plan,” and “partially blocked exit routes [and] stairwells.”101 Yet,
the warnings were ignored and business continued as usual.
Wal-Mart, whose items were found in the debris, claimed that
its suppliers continued to use the factory without authoriza-
tion.102 Sears also claimed that it was unaware that its merchan-
dise was being produced there, yet again blaming unapproved
action by a vendor.103 Walt Disney, Co., which licenses its char-
acters to numerous clothingmakers, said its records showed that
94. Dhaka Bangladesh Clothes Factory Fire Kills More Than 100, BBC
NEWS ASIA (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20482273.
95. Sabotage, Really?, supra note 92.
96. Id.; Ahmed, supra note 87; Alam, supra note 76.
97. Alam, supra note 76.
98. THE BANGLADESH LABOR LAW 62 (2006), available at
http://www.vivhaan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Bangladesh_La-
bor_Law.pdf. (“Precaution in case of fire: (1) Every establishment shall be pro-
vided with at least one alternative connection stairway with each floor and
such means of escape in case of fire and firefighting apparatus, as may be pre-
scribed by rules.”).
99. Alam, supra note 76.
100. Id.
101. Bangladesh Companies Fail to Compensate Fire Victims, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/15/bangladesh-com-
panies-fail-compensate-fire-victims.
102. Alam, supra note 76.
103. Id.
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none of its licensees had been permitted to make Disney-brand
products at the Tazreen factory for at least a year.104 But, that
was not the reality of the situation behind the factory gates, as
made clear by the Disney-brand products found among the ashes
after the blaze subsided.105
After the fires went out, finger pointing from all directions en-
sued—regarding both what caused the fire and who was to
blame.106 While the cause of this particular fire was not deter-
mined, defective wiring causes approximately 80 percent of all
factory fires in Bangladesh.107 As further evidence of that fact,
only two weeks later, an electrical fire at a nearby factory killed
another eight workers.108 Fires continue to plague the manufac-
turing ward of the city.109
OnDecember 31, 2013, over a full year after the blaze, Hossain
and twelve other factory officials were charged with “culpable
homicide” because of the gross negligence that claimed 112 in-
nocent lives.110 If proven guilty, they could face up to life in jail,
or simply be fined under the Bangladesh Penal Code.111 This
likely marks the first time a garment factory owner has been
charged in Bangladesh112—a fact almost as jarring as those re-
vealed by the fire itself.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Bangladesh Factory Fire: Brands Accused of Criminal Negligence,
CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.clean-
clothes.org/news/2012/11/25/bangladesh-factory-fire-brands-accused-of-crimi-
nal-negligence.
108. Eight Dead in Bangladesh Garment Factory Blaze, BBC NEWS ASIA
(May 9, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
22460803#TWEET749128.
109. Fire at Ashulia RMG Factory, DHAKATA TRIBUNE (Dec. 26, 2013),
http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2013/dec/26/fire-ashulia-rmg-fac-
tory.
110. Ahmed, supra note 54.
111. Id.
112. Bangladesh Orders Arrest of Factory Owners, SYDNEYMORNINGHERALD
(Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/world/bangladesh-orders-arrest-of-
factory-owners-20131231-hv76k.html; Julhas Alam, Owners Surrender in
Deadly Bangladesh Factory Fire, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 9, 2014),
http://news.yahoo.com/owners-surrender-deadly-bangladesh-factory-fire-
094206237—finance.html.
2014] READY-MADE GARMENT INDUSTRY 295
B. The Rana Plaza Building Collapse
As if the possibility of being trapped inside a burning factory
is not terrifying enough for the millions that continued to work
in the RMG industry after the Tazreen fire, an event that oc-
curred just over one year later on April 24, 2013,113 less than
seven miles away from the Tazreen Factory,114 arguably sur-
passed factory workers’ worst nightmares. The Rana Plaza
building, which housed five garment factories in four115 of its
eight floors,116 collapsed and took 1,133 lives with it, making it
the deadliest garment factory disaster in known history.117 An-
other 2,500 people were gravely injured, many disabled perma-
nently.118 Though rescuers attempted to save survivors for many
days, 150 workers are still listed as missing and newly discov-
ered remains are being found over eighteen months after the col-
lapse.119
Quite simply, the building was designed to house retail stores
and offices, not factories.120 In fact, Rana Plaza was not only
113. Farid Ahmed, Bangladesh Building Collapse Kills at Least 123, Injures
More than 1,000, CNN (April 25, 2013), http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2013/04/24/world/asia/bangladesh-building-collapse/in-
dex.html?hpt=hp_t3.
114. Driving Directions from Tazreen Fashion Factory to Rana Plaza,
GOOGLEMAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; then
search “A” for “Ashulia, Bangladesh” and search “B” for “Rana Plaza Collapsed,
Dhaka – Aricha Hwy, Savar, Bangladesh”; then follow “Get Directions” hyper-
link) (last calculated Sept. 13, 2014).
115. Ahmed, supra note 113.
116. Sabir Mustafa and Shyadul Islam, Profile: Rana Plaza Owner Moham-
mad Sohel Rana, BBC NEWS ASIA (May 3, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22366454.
117. Tansy E. Hoskins, Preventing Another Rana Plaza, BUS. OF FASHION
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.businessoffashion.com/2013/09/op-ed-preventing-
another-rana-plaza.html.
118. Id.
119. Id.; Ahmed, supra note 113; AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, More Human Re-
mains Found in Bangladesh Factory Disaster Ruins, NEWDELHI TV (Sept. 24,
2014), http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/more-human-remains-found-in-
bangladesh-factory-disaster-ruins-597216.
120. Jonathan Fahey and Anne D’Innocenzio, Leaving Bangladesh? Not an
Easy Choice for Brands, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 12, 2013), http://big-
story.ap.org/article/leaving-bangladesh-not-easy-choice-brands; David Berg-
man, Bangladesh: Rana Plaza Architect Says Building was Never Meant for
Factories, TELEGRAPH (May 3, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/asia/bangladesh/10036546/Bangladesh-Rana-Plaza-architect-says-
building-was-never-meant-for-factories.html.
296 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:1
built using substandard rods, bricks, and cement,121 but also
without a valid permit122 and on swampland.123 Amirul Haque
Amir, president of the National Garment Workers Federa-
tion in Bangladesh (“NGWF”) has explained that “[t]he owners
of the factories are ministers, ex-ministers, parliament mem-
bers, ex-parliament members, army generals, civil bureaucrats,
even university vice chancellors—[the] elite of society who have
great influence over state mechanisms.” 124 More than thirty
RMG industry leaders are currently members of the Bangla-
deshi parliament, comprising approximately 10 percent of its
lawmakers125—illuminating the possibility of corruption, collu-
sion, and bribery.126
Initial reports allege that the disaster was sparked when the
building’s rooftop generators were engaged during a blackout.127
When visible cracks appeared in the building the day before its
collapse, police officers warned the owner, Mohammad Sohel
Rana, that the building was unsafe.128 Rana, characterized by
local media as a typical Bangladeshi muscleman, known as a
“mastan,” or “neighborhood heavy,” with power and money from
121. Quadir and Paul, supra note 70.
122. Julfikar Ali Manik and Jim Yardley, Building Collapse in Bangladesh
Leaves Scores Dead, N.Y. TIMES (April 24, 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-building-collapse.html?hp.
123. Ruma Paul and Ron Popeski, Bangladesh Charges 18 over Garment Fac-
tory Collapse, REUTERS (July 16, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/07/16/us-bangladesh-ranaplaza-
idUSKBN0FL1C020140716?_ga=1.87391704.1574167753.1405986543.
124. Hoskins, supra note 117.
125. Chalmers, supra note 40; Avoiding the Fire Next Time, ECONOMIST (May
4, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21577078-after-dhaka-fac-
tory-collapse-foreign-clothing-firms-are-under-pressure-improve-working.
126. Chalmers, supra note 40; Avoiding the Fire Next Time, ECONOMIST (May
4, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21577078-after-dhaka-fac-
tory-collapse-foreign-clothing-firms-are-under-pressure-improve-working.
127. Paul and Quadir, supra note 11.
128. Interestingly, other businesses that occupied the Rana Plaza building
evacuated the day before its collapse. For example, employees of the Savar
branch of BRAC Bank were evacuated the day prior, after the crack was de-
tected, and were ordered not to show up on the day the building collapsed. None
of the bank’s workers were among the injured or dead—leading to questions as
to why the work was deemed important enough to risk so many lives only in
the RMG factories that day. See Ahmed, supra note 113; T. J. Dhaka, The New
Collapsing Building, ECONOMIST (April 25, 2013), http://www.econo-
mist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/04/disaster-bangladesh.
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his affiliations with local politicians, 129 ignored the officers’
warnings and his complex remained open for business.130
As Rana pointed his finger and shifted the blame to the factory
owners,131 many of the survivors also claimed that their employ-
ers had pressured them to turn up for work as usual on the day
of the fire.132 One survivor, twenty-two year old Rebecca Khatun,
who lost her left leg, right foot and five of her family members,
including her mother, in the collapse, recalled the morning of the
catastrophe as follows: “We didn’t want to enter the building be-
cause of the huge cracks” detected the day before, “[b]ut theman-
ager told us unless you go in, you won’t get paid and you’ll lose
your job. So, we entered, but I vowed then that I would collect
that month’s salary and quit.”133 She remained crushed under-
neath a beam until rescuers found her the following day.134
A lawsuit was filed against Rana over a year after the collapse,
but only after the Anti-Corruption Commission had filed a sep-
arate case, accusing seventeen people of grossly breaching regu-
lations and codes while constructing the building.135 Rana was
arrested after a four-day manhunt while allegedly trying to flee
to India, was detained, but was released on bail—further anger-
ing Bangladeshis who had hoped for the death penalty.136
In understanding the calculated decision Khatun made to risk
her own life, however, note that Bangladesh’s RMG workers
were paid an average of less than US$40 a month at the time,
while the estimated cost of basic living necessities is about
US$120 a month.137 Though the Bangladeshi Ministry of Labor
recently raised the minimum wage to about US$68 a month for
129. Mustafa and Islam, supra note 116.
130. Dhaka, supra note 128.
131. Mustafa and Islam, supra note 116.
132. Dhaka, supra note 128.
133. Julie McCarthy, Bangladesh Collapse: The Garment Workers Who Sur-
vived, NPR (July 10, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/paral-
lels/2013/07/10/200644781/Bangladesh-Collapse-The-Garment-Workers-Who-
Survived.
134. Id.
135. Paul and Popeski, supra note 123.
136. Julie Zerbo, Rana Plaza Owner Finally Named in Tragedy-Related Law-
suit, THE FASHION L. (July 15, 2014), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/rana-
plaza-owner-finally-named-in-tragedy-related-lawsuit/; Bail for Rana Plaza
Owner, DAILY STAR (March 24, 2014), http://www.thedailystar.net/bail-for-
rana-plaza-owner-16994.
137. Hoskins, supra note 117.
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garment workers—an increase of about 77 percent—in Decem-
ber, 2013,138 Bangladeshi RMG workers still remain the lowest
paid in the world.139 These underpaid individuals simply work
to live; yet, many lost their lives while working.140
III: THE CURRENTMONITORING OF THE RMG INDUSTRY BY
BANGLADESH AND THEUNITED STATES
The RMG industry accounts for 80 percent of Bangladesh’s an-
nual exports and a 15 percent share of its GDP.141 The RMG in-
dustry also accounts for 45 percent of all industrial employment
in the country.142 As a result, it is not surprising that, although
Rana Plaza contained a number of different businesses, it was
the RMGworkers who were essentially forced to work on the day
of the collapse—as it is the four million RMG workers who form
the backbone of Bangladesh’s economy. Yet, these workers are
disregarded by the employers, the government, and the entire
industry alike.143 Understanding the regulation—or failed regu-
lation—of this highly influential industry requires a two-
pronged analysis focusing on domestic, Bangladeshi laws as well
as international laws. While a detailed discussion of the complex
history of Bangladesh’s government and labor laws is outside the
138. Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Bangladesh Factory Owners Way of Wage In-
crease, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/arti-
cles/SB10001424052702304579404579235351833424162; Bangladesh to Raise
Garment Workers’ Minimum Wage, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-11-04/bangladesh-to-raise-garment-
workers-minimum-wage.
139. Monthly minimum salaries for garment sector workers in Bangladesh
average around US$38, far below the US$100 average for Indian factory work-
ers. See Shelly Bajno, Bangladesh Garment Factories Often Evade Monitoring,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB10001424052702304795804579101003566148372.html; See also Chan-
drasekaran, supra note 46.
140. McCarthy, supra note 133.
141. Md. Mazedul Islam, Adnan Maroof Khan and Md. Monirul Islam, supra
note 53, at 31.
142. Id.
143. Liana Foxvog, Judy Gearhart, Samantha Maher, Liz Parker, Ben
Vanpeperstraete, and Ineke Zeldenrust, Still Waiting: Six Months After the
History’s Deadliest Apparel Industry Disaster, Workers Continue to Fight for
Compensation, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, http://www.cleanclothes.org/re-
sources/publications/still-waiting (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
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scope of this Note,144 a survey of the state of modern laws and
regulations provides an illustration of where the country cur-
rently stands, and where it must go in order to make substantive
changes—and to ultimately prevent fatal disasters like the Taz-
reen fire and the Rana Plaza collapse in the future.
A. Bangladesh’s Domestic Regulation of the RMG Industry.
Labor law legislation in Bangladesh dates as far back as
1881.145 During the subsequent 100 years, over fifty acts, ordi-
nances, and regulations, were passed in an attempt to regulate
labor and employment.146 Because these laws were enacted in a
piecemeal fashion, contradictions often arose between legisla-
tions that were not particularly well suited to address Bangla-
desh’s emergence onto the global marketplace.147 As a symbol of
that emergence, Bangladesh became a member of the United
Nations’ International Labour Organization (“ILO”) on June 22,
1972.148 The ILO is “devoted to promoting social justice and in-
ternationally recognized human and labour rights, pursuing its
144. For a discussion, see generally Lisa Clay, The Effectiveness of the Worker
Rights Provisions of the Generalized System of Preferences: The Bangladesh
Case Study, 11 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 (2001).
145. See BANGLADESH EMPLOYERS’ FEDERATION, A HANDBOOK ON THE
BANGLADESH LABOUR ACT, 1-2 (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/trav-
ail/docs/353/A%20Handbook%20on%20the%20Bangladesh%20La-
bour%20Act%202006.pdf.
Laws regulating employer and establishment with regard to the
rights and interests of workers were introduced during the colonial
time before the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country.
The Factories Act, 1881, was the first law of its kind. Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act, 1923, Trade Unions Act, 1926, Trade Disputes Act,
1929, Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Maternity Benefit Act 1939, and
the Employment of Children Act, 1938 are the subsequent legislation
of the colonial era. [The Factories Act, 1881] was subsequently re-
pealed by the Factories Act, 1934, which was again repealed by the
Factories Act, 1965, which gave effect to some of the ILO conventions.
Id.
146. Id, at 2–4.
147. Id, at 4–5.
148. About Us, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Aboutus/lang--
en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
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founding mission that labour peace is essential to prosperity.”149
Along with the Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Employ-
ers’ Federation,150 and the National Coordination Committee for
Workers’ Education,151 the ILO has been working toward pro-
moting decent and productive employment opportunities for
Bangladeshi workers since its inception.152 The ILO, however,
has no formal ability to sanction, and, practically, the enforce-
ment of its rules requires discreet persuasion by ILO officials or
public embarrassment through the media.153
In 1992, a thirty-eight member National Labour Law Commis-
sion began the task of revising the varied Bangladeshi labor leg-
islation in order to codify one comprehensive code.154 After four-
teen years, the Bangladesh Labour Act of 2006 (“Labor Act”) was
passed and took effect.155 The Labor Act addressed wages, work-
ing hours, leave, child labor, requirements for employee identi-
fication cards, death benefits, safety, unfair labor practices, and
149. ILO Missions and Objectives, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang--en/in-
dex.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
150. The Bangladesh Employers’ Federation, founded in 1998, now repre-
sents nearly 90 percent of the established employers in the private sector, in-
cluding the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation, Bangladesh Power Develop-
ment Board and numerous associations from industries like the RMG, leather,
agro-processing and frozen food sectors. About BEF, BANGLADESH EMPLOYERS’
FED’N (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.bef.org.bd/.
151. Workers and Employers Organizations, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Areasofwork/workers-and-employers-organiza-
tions/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015)
National Coordination Committee for Workers’ Education is a united
platform of fourteen major national trade union federations in Bang-
ladesh who represent the maximum number of workers and employ-
ees of the country. It is affiliated with International Trade Union Con-
federation (ITUC) and World Federation of Trade Union (WFTU), and
also with the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF).
Id.
152. INT’L LABOURORG., supra note 148.
153. Lance Compa and Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing Interna-
tional Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 CORNELL. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 663, 671 (1995).
154. BANGLADESH EMPLOYERS’ FEDERATION, supra note 145, at 5; See also,
Bangladesh Labour Act, Ch. VI, Section 61, available at
http://www.vivhaan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Bangladesh_La-
bor_Law.pdf.
155. Id.
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the rights to collectively bargain and participate in trade un-
ions.156
Chapter VI of the Labor Act addresses safety standards and
requirements in establishments with conditions that are “dan-
gerous to human life or safety” and provides for recourse
[i]f it appears to the Inspector that the use of any building or
part of a building or of any part of the ways, machinery or plant
in the establishment involves imminent danger to human life
or safety, he may serve on the employer of the establishment
an order in writing prohibiting its use until it has been properly
repaired or altered.157
Under this legislation, however, tragedies have still oc-
curred—casting doubt on its ultimate effectiveness.158 This has
been blamed largely on how the Labor Act, and the government
in general, treats unions and labor activism.159 The anti-union
demeanor of the industry barred any opportunity to resolve
dire industrial relations issues, such as safety and health,
through either dialogue or collective negotiation.160 Instead, the
industry, with the support of the government, has been consist-
ently fighting to stop labor organization by promoting participa-
tion committees in place of unions.161 These committees have no
power to bargain over the actual terms and conditions of worker
employment, and are typically dominated by management’s
carefully selected representatives from among its employees.162
With pressure from many fronts mounting after the Rana
Plaza disaster, the Bangladeshi government enacted amend-
ments to the Labor Act on July 15, 2013.163 Almost immediately,
however, the amendments were criticized.164 An initial review
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Chalmers, supra note 40.
159. Id.
160. Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights: Bangladesh, ITUC-CSI-
IGB, http://survey.ituc-csi.org/Bangladesh.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. ILO Statement on Reform of Bangladesh Labour Law, INT’L LABOUR
ORG. (July 22, 2013), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-cen-
tre/statements-and-speeches/WCMS_218067/lang--en/index.htm.
164. Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls Short, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July
15, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/15/bangladesh-amended-labor-
law-falls-short.
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by the ILO suggested that the amendments addressed some of
its specific concerns, but still fell short of several significant
steps called for by the ILO supervisory system to bring the law
into compliance with ratified international labor standards.165
On a positive note, the amendment did include several key pro-
visions to improve workplace safety, such as the formation of
safety committees in factories of fifty workers or more, the re-
quirement of individual safety equipment and the establishment
of health centers in workplaces of more than 5,000 employees.166
“No matter how much training [in safety] you have [however],
you can’t walk through flames or escape a collapsed building,”
said Ineke Zeldenrust of the Amsterdam based Clean Clothes
Campaign, which lobbies for garment workers’ rights.167
Simultaneously, the amendment makes unionization more dif-
ficult, as it requires a minimum of 30 percent of the workers in
an establishment to join a union in order for the government to
register it—furthermore requiring that unions select their lead-
ers from workers within the establishment.168 Requiring selec-
tion from within will enable employers to force union leaders out
by firing them for superficial reasons, which is a common prac-
tice worldwide.169 “The issue is that even if you have a legal right
to form a union, the question is, what is being done to protect
that right once you try ‘operationalize’ it—when you try to or-
ganize a meeting or pass out pamphlets or become known as a
union activist?”170
Moreover, the amendment also allows the government to stop
a strike if it would cause “serious hardship to the community,”
165. ILO, supra note 148.
166. Revised Bangladesh Labour Law ‘Falls Short’ of International Stand-
ards – UN Agency, UN NEWS CENTER (July 22, 2013),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45470#.Un_8F5SxNvb.
167. Kay Johnson and Julhas Alam,Big Brands Rejected Bangladesh Factory
Safety Plan, YAHOO! NEWS (Apr. 26, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/big-brands-
rejected-bangladesh-factory-safety-plan-122206229.html.
168. Bangladesh: Amended Labor Law Falls Short, supra note 164.
169. Id.
170. Syed Zain Al-Mahmood and Tripti Lahiri, Bangladesh Opens Door to
More Unions, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/arti-
cles/SB10001424127887324216004578480813191051492.
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or be “prejudicial to the national interest.”171 These undefined
terms are rather ambiguous and ripe for abusive interpretation.
Should workers attempt to protest, they are likely to face life-
threatening situations at the hands of Bangladeshi police.172 In
fact, the government also set up a 2,990-man Industrial Police
force to collect intelligence and prevent unrest in factory
zones.173 This practice is common in the industry.174
B. The United States’ Regulation of the RMG Industry.
With the United States purchasing around 25 percent of Bang-
ladesh’s exports,175 it is in a unique position, having the most
external control of Bangladesh’s market. Because it holds the
largest single share of exports, the United States must adopt
standards and guidelines that will substantially improve Bang-
ladeshi labor practices. Fearing that enforcement will encourage
corporations toward more economically profitable locations, de-
veloping countries like Bangladesh cannot, and simply will not,
enforce their own labor standards and regulations.176
The United States began moving its manufacturing abroad as
early as the 1950s.177 While Bangladesh’s contribution came dec-
ades later,178 adequate labor enforcement standards have argu-
ably not accompanied this transition in production.179 Incidents
like the Tazreen Factory fire and Rana Plaza collapse have re-
cently brought factory conditions to the attention of the world.180
171. Steven Greenhouse, Under Pressure, Bangladesh Adopts New Labor
Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/07/17/world/asia/under-pressure-bangladesh-adopts-new-la-
bor-law.html?_r=2&.
172. On September 20, 2013, Bangladeshi police used batons, rubber bullets,
and tear gas to stop a five-day protest that resulted in authorities closing more
than 100 factories. Garment Workers, Police Clash in Bangladesh, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/09/26/gar-
ment-workers-police-clash-in-bangladesh_2013-09-26/.
173. Chalmers, supra note 40.
174. Bangladesh Factories Shut AmidWorkers’ Protests, ABCNEWS (Sept. 25,
2013), http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/100-factories-shut-
bangladesh-workers-protest-20365442.
175. Greenhouse and Clifford, supra note 13.
176. Gormley, supra note 69, at 125.
177. Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 19, at 612.
178. Heitzman and Worden, supra note 29.
179. Gormley, supra note 69, at 125.
180. See supra sections IIA and IIB.
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Succumbing to media pressure, many multinational corpora-
tions have developed their own unique human rights monitoring
systems.181 Since the early 1990s, many large, U.S. corporations
have adopted internal, voluntary measures to regulate produc-
tion of their goods.182 Two leading types of voluntary measures
now exist in the form of corporate codes of conduct and self-de-
termined product labeling schemes.183 Corporations that pledge
to follow a corporate code of conduct make a voluntary, written
promise to respect labor rights listed in their individualized
code.184 Product labeling schemes require that, in addition to ad-
hering to the code, corporations affix a label to their products,
which certifies that they are made under acceptable working
conditions. For example, such a label might guarantee that
clothing was produced without the labor of children under a
specified age.185 It is unclear, however, whether these self-im-
posed ethical protocols are anything more than “publicity
gold”—having no real legal effect.186
Since these initiatives are “market-based and essentially treat
humane workplace conditions as private goods for which con-
sumers are willing to pay a premium,”187 effective measures re-
quire both coherence and integrity via external monitoring and
the public disclosure of violations.188 While clear and convincing
private initiatives may have some degree of positive effects on
labor practices, these effects will be limited to a small group of
workers in any developing nation.189 “Direct effects will be fur-
181. Gormley, supra note 69, at 125.
182. Haley Revak, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Binding Contract or Ideal
Publicity?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1645, 1646 (2012).
183. Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling
Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights
Through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW&POL’Y INT’LBUS. 111, 113 (1998).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Revak, supra note 182, at 1646.
187. Liubicic, supra note 183, at 113.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 114.
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ther limited by [the] innumerable problems prevalent in moni-
toring compliance systems.”190 First, these voluntary steps usu-
ally do not contain mechanisms for enforcement.191 Second, they
generally do not contain any monitoring provisions.192 Third,
even when a code requires monitoring, the monitoring is rarely
conducted by an independent agency, thus setting legitimacy
further into doubt.193 As a result, they are often seen as “stand-
ards without teeth, and function primarily as a public relations
gesture.”194
In addition to these schemes, and in direct response to the
Rana Plaza collapse, a group of primarily North American ap-
parel companies, retailers, and brands,195 led in part by the meg-
abrands Gap, Target and Wal-Mart, founded the Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety to develop and launch the Bangla-
desh Worker Safety Initiative (“Initiative”).196 Recognizing that
the “safety record of Bangladeshi factories is unacceptable and
requires . . . collective effort,” to correct, the Initiative hopes to
“prevent future tragedies by consolidating and amplifying . . .
individual efforts to bring about real and sustained progress.”197
Since it was promulgated on May 13, 2013,198 however, the Ini-
tiative has faced criticism for a number of reasons. As a com-
pany-developed and company-controlled arrangement, skepti-
cism has inevitably arisen about its motives.199
190. Id.
191. Laura Ho et. al., (Dis)assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the
Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383, 402 (1996).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. As of Sept. 12, 2014, twenty-six brands joined. See About the Alliance for
Bangladesh Workers Safety, ALLIANCE FORWORKERS SAFETY, http://www.bang-
ladeshworkersafety.org/en/about/about-the-alliance (last visited Sept. 12,
2014).
196. ALLIANCE FOR BANGLADESH WORKERS SAFETY, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE,
available at https://www.wewear.org/assets/1/16/CEO-Letter-7.9-CR-11pm.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) about the Bangladesh Safety Ac-
cord, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, http://www.cleanclothes.org/issues/faq-
safety-accord (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); see generally Gap and Walmart in
Bangladesh: A History of Irresponsibility and Empty Promises, CLEAN CLOTHS
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The Initiative valiantly committed US$42 million for worker
safety in Bangladesh, including factory inspections and an anon-
ymous hot line for workers to report concerns, and more than
US$100 million in loans and financing to help Bangladeshi fac-
tory owners correct safety problems over five years.200 The onus,
however, is on the factory owners themselves to inspect and im-
prove their workplaces, and the signatories to the Initiative are
not bound to finance any needed improvements, independent of
these loans.201 Furthermore, few requirements are imposed on
members, and any member can abandon the agreement when-
ever it chooses.202 In fact, the Initiative is not legally binding and
lacks commitments to pay for any improvements whatsoever.203
Essentially, if a factory is not up to the standard, and does not
fix the problems on its own, the American retailers simply say
they will no longer do business there.204 While, at first, it may
seem that no longer manufacturing in Bangladesh would be a
viable solution to this problem, it is also a naïve one. Simply pull-
ing out of the country, like the Walt Disney Co. has, 205 could
CAMPAIGN, http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/background/history-gap-
and-walmart-bangladesh (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
200. Greenhouse and Clifford, supra note 13; see also Press Release, Alliance
for Bangladesh Workers Safety, Alliance of Leading Retailers in North Amer-
ica Join Forces in Comprehensive, Fire-Year Commitment to Improve Factory
Safety Conditions for Workers in Bangladesh, 3 (July 10, 2013), available at
http://az204679.vo.msecnd.net/media/documents/bangladesh-alliance-press-
release_130179348070616796.pdf.
201. Id.; As of September, 2014, the Initiative has inspected 587 factories in
Bangladesh and has either fully or partially closed ten of them, though reports
allege that they have “identified 45 problems in each of the 587 factories it has
inspected so far”—a small percentage actually shut. See Setbacks Still Remain
in Factory Safety: Alliance, DAILY STAR (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://bd.thedailystar.net/business/setbacks-still-remain-in-factory-safety-alli-
ance-41149; see also Steven Greenhouse & Elizabeth A. Harris, Battling for a
Safer Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES (April 21, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/04/22/business/international/battling-for-a-safer-bangla-
desh.html?_r=0.
202. (FAQ) about Bangladesh Safety Accord, supra note 199.
203. Greenhouse and Clifford, supra note 13; see also Shelly Banjo, Wal-
Mart, Gap Press for Safety in Bangladesh, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/arti-
cles/SB10001424052702304402104579151942188514188/.
204. (FAQ) about Bangladesh Safety Accord, supra note 199.
205. Emily Jane Fox, Disney Pulls Out of Bangladesh Factories, CNNMONEY
(May 2, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/02/news/companies/disney-bang-
ladesh/.
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“devastate Bangladesh’s economy, while threatening the liveli-
hood of millions.”206 “The whole nation should not be made to
suffer,” Mohammad Fazlul Azim, a member of the Bangladesh
Parliament and an influential garment factory owner has
said.207 “This industry is very important to us. Fourteen million
families depend on this. It is a huge number of people who are
dependent on this industry.”208 Since businesses like Walt Dis-
ney Co. have profited from their relations with Bangladesh in
the past, it is fundamentally misguided for companies to avoid
responsibility by simply deserting.
Thus, the Initiative arguably “preserves the very model that
has failed workers for years and failed to prevent nearly two
thousand deaths.”209 In essence, the Initiative’s proponents dis-
cuss renovations but lack substance.210 Without legal accounta-
bility, the Initiative is not worth the paper it is written on.211
C. What neither Bangladesh nor the United States are Doing—
an Examination of Europe’s Regulation of the RMG Industry
A competing plan, created to address the issues facing Bang-
ladesh’s RMG industry, further illuminates the Initiative’s
shortcomings—and areas for potential growth. With “the goal of
a safe and sustainable Bangladeshi RMG industry in which no
worker needs to fear fires, building collapses, or other accidents
that could be prevented with reasonable health and safety
206. Steven Greenhouse, Bangladesh Fears an Exodus of Apparel Firms,
N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/business/fac-
tory-owners-in-bangladesh-fear-firms-will-exit.html.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. (FAQ) about Bangladesh Safety Accord, supra note 199.
210. Greenhouse and Clifford, supra note 13.
211. Tell Gap to Support Safe Working Conditions, GLOBAL CITIZEN PROJECT
(Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.globalcitizen.org/Content/Con-
tent.aspx?id=fec9868d-a446-4c95-9927-28871325c211; see also Comparison:
The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and the Gap/Walmart
Scheme, CLEAN CLOTHS CAMPAIGN, http://www.cleanclothes.org/re-
sources/background/comparison-safety-accord-and-the-gap-walmart-scheme
(last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
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measures,”212 a number of international parties signed the Ac-
cord of Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (“Accord”).213 Sig-
natories include over 170 international brands and retailers,214
global unions, 215 local unions, 216 non-governmental organiza-
tions217 and the ILO, as an independent chair to the commit-
tee.218 Notably, the Accord also includes an important role for
workers and worker representatives, including direct trade un-
ion participation.219 Furthermore, European governments have
given the Accord a great deal of support, bordering on pressure.
For example, the European Parliament Resolution of May 20,
2013, on Health and Safety in the Bangladesh Garment Indus-
try fully supported the Accord, as well as the Dutch Minister of
Foreign Trade, the French Minister of Foreign Trade, the Dan-
ish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Minister of Inter-
national Development and the U.K. Minister of State to name a
few.220
Under the Accord, which will run for five years, each signatory
commits to the following: facilitating independent fire safety in-
spections by trained experts, public reporting and disclosure,
mandatory repairs financed by the brands themselves, worker
representatives placed in factories to educate workers about
212. ACCORD ONFIRE ANDBUILDING SAFETY INBANGLADESH, 1 (May 13, 2013),
http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf.
213. Id.
214. For a full list, see Signatories, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN
BANGLADESH, http://www.bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/ (last visited May
13, 2013); see also More Brands Commit to the Accord on Fire & Building Safety
in Bangladesh, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.clean-
clothes.org/news/2013/05/14/more-brands-commit-to-the-accord-on-fire-build-
ing-safety-in-bangladesh.
215. Id. (As of Sept. 4, 2014, this included the IndustriALL Global Un-
ion & UNI Global Union).
216. Signatories, supra note 214. (As of Sept. 4, 2014, this included the Bang-
ladesh Textile and Garments Workers League, Bangladesh Independent Gar-
ments Workers Union Federation, Bangladesh Garments Textile & Leather
Workers Federation, IndustriALL Bangladesh Council, Bangladesh Revolu-
tionary Garments Workers Federation, National Garments Workers Federa-
tion, and the United Federation of Garments Workers.).
217. Id. As of Sept. 4, 2014, this included the Clean Clothes Cam-
paign, Maquila Solidarity Network, International Labor Rights Forum, and
Workers Rights Consortium.
218. (FAQ) about Bangladesh Safety Accord, supra note 199.
219. ACCORD ON FIRE ANDBUILDING SAFETY INBANGLADESH, supra note 212.
220. (FAQ) about Bangladesh Safety Accord, supra note 199.
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safety and workers’ rights, and a safe and confidential com-
plaints process.221 Most recently, the Accord’s technical team fi-
nalized the fire, electrical, and building inspection standards it
will use to inspect all factories producing for signatory brands.222
It represents not only a commitment to inspect 1,500 factories
by September, 2014, but also to publish the results and infor-
mation on necessary remediation.223 Additionally,
[a] unique aspect of the [Accord] is its legal enforcement. Sec-
tion 5 of the Accord explicitly outlines the process of dispute
resolution, in which the outcomes can be reinforced in the court
of law. This feature is unique because previously established
initiatives involving corporate accountability and labour rights
are basically voluntary commitments. Many U.S. companies
refuse to sign the Accord based on this legal enforceability,
fearing lawsuits. However, in essence the Accord’s legal obliga-
tions do not differ much from other business contracts compa-
nies routinely chose.224
When comparing the two, the Initiative has been called “a pale
imitation” of the legally binding Accord, and criticized alongside
previous voluntary initiatives that have not functioned well in
the past.225
221. ACCORD ON FIRE ANDBUILDING SAFETY INBANGLADESH, supra note 212.
222. Id.
223. Id.; As of Sept. 5, 2014, the Accord conducted over 1,000 inspections and
posted over 250 Corrective Action Plans online. Press Release, Accord on Fire
and Building Safety in Bangladesh, AccordMakes Good Progress Towards Safe
Factories in Bangladesh (Sept. 5, 2014) (available at http://bangla-
deshaccord.org/2014/09/accord-makes-good-progress-towards-safe-factories-
bangladesh/).
224. (FAQ) about Bangladesh Safety Accord, supra note 199.
225. Greenhouse and Clifford, supra note 13; see generally Benjamin Hensler
& Jeremy Blasi, Making Global Corporations’ Labor Rights Commitments Le-
gally Enforceable: The Bangladesh Breakthrough, WORKERS RIGHTS
CONSORTIUM (June 18, 2013), http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/recom-
mended-reading/making-global-corporations2019-labor-rights-commitments-
legally-enforceable-the-bangladesh-breakthrough.
In sum, the inclusion of contractually enforceable obligations on
brands and retailers in the Accord on Building and Fire Safety in
Bangladesh is a major breakthrough for global labor rights. By put-
ting teeth behind strong substantive commitments, the agreement
holds the promise of finally addressing the worker safety crisis in
Bangladesh. Contrary to the claims of its critics, however, it does not
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IV: WHATMORE SHOULD THEUNITED STATESDO TO ADDRESS
THE PROBLEMS PLAGUING THE RMG INDUSTRY IN
BANGLADESH?
“The worldwide growth of international capital in the garment
industry places great control in the hands of American corpora-
tions instead of the government.”226 The principal control, how-
ever, must be placed back in the hands of the government with
a simple, three-pronged solution. Since the United States pur-
chases such a large percentage of Bangladesh’s RMG exports,227
it must take a stand to enact realistic and effective solutions to
counteract the abuses occurring within the RMG industry. This
Note recommends an approach composed of three separate, yet
interrelated, steps. First, the U.S. government, along with labor
advocacy groups, must develop campaigns to educate, persuade
and convince American consumers to pressure brands to raise
their labor standards, either by amending the Initiative or by
signing onto the Accord. Second, the U.S. government must bol-
ster these campaigns by implementing a system that utilizes
standard American intellectual property law, via certification
trademarks, to provide consumers with a trustworthy and relia-
ble guarantee that compliant products are made clearly visible
and available for public consumption. Third, and finally, the
U.S. government must utilize Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) by passing legislation that prohibits goods from entering
the U.S. market if they are made under certain unacceptable
conditions, or without the certification.
This Note recognizes that attempting to prevent future inci-
dents does not make up for the tremendous losses the people of
Bangladesh have already suffered. Years after the Tazreen fire
and Rana Plana collapse, many injured victims, as well as the
families of the deceased, had still not received any compensa-
tion.228 Frustration is inevitable, as survivors that face destitu-
tion and are now unable to work have been forced to sell off their
impose substantial risks of undefined legal liability on the signatory
companies.
Id. at 5.
226. Gormley, supra note 69, at 134.
227. See supra Section ID.
228. Bangladesh: Companies Fail to Compensate Fire Victims, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/15/bangladesh-com-
panies-fail-compensate-fire-victims; see also BOF Team, supra note 7.
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possessions or beg for money in order to pay for treatment.229
When Bangladeshi workers took justice into their own hands on
December 3, 2013, and burned down another factory that mainly
supplied Gap and Wal-Mart, they brought this issue back into
the international spotlight.230 Though no one was harmed in the
blaze,231 such vigilantism is unlikely to spur progress, and only
causes more harm.232
A. Step One: Spread Awareness, Persuade and Convince
The first aspect of this Note’s solution will have the largest
impact and will also be the easiest to accomplish—because a
movement is already under way. At the most fundamental level,
individuals within a society must be aware of something before
they can take steps to support or condemn it.233 Without access
to truthful, relevant information, individuals remain ignorant
and lack power to make cognizant decisions or take action. It is
unlikely that citizens would continue to embrace cheap clothing,
knowing that it is laced with corruption, suffering, and exploita-
tion. As a result, the U.S. government must take proactive steps
229. Id.; Bruce Kennedy, The Bangladesh Factory Collapse Over One Year
Later,CBSMONEYWATCH (April, 23, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-
bangladesh-factory-collapse-one-year-later/.
230. Serajul Quadir, Workers Burn Down Bangladesh Garment Factory that
Supplied Gap, Wal-Mart, Zara, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/workers-burn-down-bangladesh-garment-fac-
tory-that-supplied-gap-wal-mart-zara-2013-12.
231. Id.
232. For a full discussion, see generally Nahla Valji and Bronwyn Harris,
Vigilantes Push Us Farther from Justice, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE
ANDRECONCILIATION (Jul. 1, 2003), http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php/media-ar-
ticles/latest-csvr-in-the-media/2316-vigilantes-push-us-further-from-jus-
tice.html.
[V]igilantism can initiate a dangerous self-perpetuating spiral. Mob
justice is characterized by violent methods, often resulting in death.
Vigilantes are therefore contributing to crime and lawlessness them-
selves, and in doing so are threatening the very human rights culture
upon which our new democracy is built. Rather than alleviating the
crime situation, vigilantes are exacerbating it.
Id.
233. David Court, Dave Elzinga, Susan Mulder, and Ole Jørgen Vetvik, The
Consumer Decision Journey, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (June 2009),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/marketing_sales/the_consumer_deci-
sion_journey.
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to spread awareness of the horrors plaguing Bangladesh’s RMG
industry—or, at the very least, support organizations that do so.
For example, Global Citizen, an initiative by the Global Poverty
Project, is an education and advocacy organization that works to
increase the number and effectiveness of individuals taking ac-
tion to end extreme poverty throughout the world.234 Rather
than focusing on fund raising, Global Citizen places its resources
toward advocacy and awareness by utilizing the budding power
of social media to transform individuals into activists by encour-
aging its members to do things like sign petitions, or share in-
formation via their Facebook and Twitter accounts.235 With the
goal of capitalizing on this potential to affect change,
Global Citizen harnesses the power and reach of online and
mobile technology to provide passionate people with opportu-
nities to learn about issues and take online action anytime, an-
ywhere. It will also provide a variety of offline action opportu-
nities—offering users pathways and journeys to more, and
more varied, action.236
On November 22, 2013, Global Citizen, with the belief “that
the power of the consumer is about more than just demanding
cheap fashion” and the goal of “fairness for those that make our
clothes,” created a petition requesting that the Gap specifically
sign the Accord in order to bolster “a fashion industry that helps
lift people out of extreme poverty, not trap them in it.”237 Actions
like this, which heighten public awareness, essentially force
brands to take action or face public ridicule and, eventually, loss
of profit. While the Gap has yet to sign the Accord, an example
of a similar, and successful, initiative was the United Students
234. Frequently Asked Questions, GLOBAL CITIZEN, http://www.globalciti-
zen.org/AboutUs/AboutUs.aspx?typeId=17 (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Tell GAP to Support Safe Working Conditions, GLOBAL CITIZEN,
http://www.globalcitizen.org/Content/Content.aspx?id=fec9868d-a446-4c95-
9927-28871325c211 (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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Against Sweatshops’238 “End Deathtraps” Campaign.239 As a re-
sult of community activism, including demonstrations and peti-
tions, 240 four American universities now require brands that
manufacture their university apparel to sign the Accord, 241
which has indirectly caused a number of brands to also sign the
Accord for all of their products.242
In an internet-driven and socially-connected society, it is eas-
ier than ever to spur, develop, and foster a movement toward
social change.243 The government must seize this opportunity for
positive action. If individual Internet users can spark such triv-
ial trends as viral animal videos or prank videos that spread al-
most instantaneously throughout the world, 244 even a small gov-
ernment agency, with limited resources, would have a definitive
impact and perhaps be the ripple that starts the tidal wave of
reform. The agency could easily be composed of teams of younger
individuals, eager to make a change in this sector245 and armed
238. United Students Against Sweatshops is currently the nation’s largest
student-led, labor campaign organization, with affiliated locals on over 150
American college campuses. About, ORGANIZING STUDENT & WORKER POWER,
http://usas.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
239. Zoe Willingham, Ten Victories to End Deathtraps in 2013, UNITED
STUDENTSAGAINSTSWEATSHOPS (Dec, 29, 2013), http://usas.org/2013/12/29/ten-
victories-to-end-deathtraps-in-2013/.
240. Fahey & D’Innocenzio, supra note 120.
241. These universities are Duke University, New York University, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, and Temple University. SeeWillingham, supra note 239.
242. These brands are Adidas, Top of the World, Fruit of the Loom, Knights
Apparel, and Zephyr Headwear. Id.
243. In fact, some shoppers already took to the Internet to voice their disap-
proval of brands that had sourced from Rana Plaza. See Emily Fox, Shoppers
Lash Out at Stores Over Bangladesh, CNN MONEY (May 2, 2013),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/01/news/companies/bangladesh-factory-shop-
pers/index.html.
244. A viral video is defined as “[a] video that spreads quickly via the Inter-
net. It is often a short clip on a video sharing site such as YouTube or Vimeo
that people reference in blogs, e-mails and instant messages.” PC MAGAZINE
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/58238/viral-video
(last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
245. Formed in 1997, United Students Against Sweatshops is a “grassroots
organization of youth and students who believe that a powerful and dynamic
labor movement will ensure greater justice for all people.” Only students can
join. For more information see generally Organizational Structure, UNITED
STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS, http://usas.org/about/structure/#art3 (last
visited July 24, 2014); National Leadership, UNITED STUDENTS AGAINST
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with modern, relevant knowledge about the socially driven
world around them. The younger generation would gain valua-
ble experience and the world would benefit.
One demonstration of this potential is KONY2012—a short
film designed to raise public awareness about an obscure African
war criminal in the hope of rallying the world to stop him.246 In
a single day, the video boasted over forty-one million online
views, and, in six days, surpassed 100 million views.247 As a di-
rect result, the global movement reached Congress 248 via a
strongly supported bipartisan resolution, 249 and President
Obama sent 100 U.S. military advisors to Africa to support local
efforts to locate Kony and assist affected communities.250 Amer-
ican attention was heightened and change was sparked.251 The
viewership numbers speak volumes about the potential impact
of video campaigns that audiences choose to watch.252 In order
to choose to watch them, however, the videos must first be cre-
ated and distributed. Tech-savvy millennials, with government
support, have the ability to create a more transparent industry
with the power to create change.253 At a recent summit, for ex-
ample, 120 international students and young professionals from
SWEATSHOPS, http://usas.org/about/national-leadership/ (last visited July 24,
2014).
246. Kony 2012, INVISIBLE CHILDREN, http://invisiblechildren.com/kony/ (last
visited Jan. 2, 2014).
247. Matt Fiorentino, Ten Stats That Will Change the Way You Look at Video
in 2013, AD AGE (Dec. 27, 2012), http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/ten-stats-
change-video-2013/238915/.
248. Chris Coons, Pursuing Joseph Kony, COONS.SENATE.GOV
http://www.coons.senate.gov/kony/ (last visited Nov. 25 2014).
249. Scott Wong, Joseph Kony Captures Congress’ Attention, POLITICO (Mar.
22, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74355.html.
250. Coons, supra note 238.
251. Wong, supra note 249. “When you get 100 million Americans looking at
something, you will get our attention,” said Senator Lindsey Graham, a co-
sponsor of the resolution. “This YouTube sensation is [going to] help the Con-
gress be more aggressive and will do more to lead to his demise than all other
action combined.” Furthermore, Graham deemed the video’s success a “break-
through on the foreign policy front,” likening it to how Twitter and Facebook
have sparked political uprisings in places like Egypt and Tunisia.
252. Fiorentino, supra note 247.
253. Nora Locskai, Avoiding Another Rana Plaza Will Take More Than Out-
rage, STUDENT REPORTER (July 15, 2014), http://studen-
treporter.org/2014/07/avoiding-another-rana-plaza-will-take-more-than-out-
rage/.
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top business and design schools demanded “garments which de-
liver trustworthy experiences.”254 As the saying goes, knowledge
is power.
B. Step Two: Bolster Consumer Confidence
Once the public is made aware of the issues plaguing the RMG
industry, they must also be empowered to make socially con-
scious purchases. Since the early 1990s, many large U.S. corpo-
rations have adopted internal, voluntary measures to regulate
production of their goods.255 One of the main ways brands now
regulate internally is with product labeling schemes.256 It is un-
clear, however, whether these self-imposed ethical protocols are
anything more than public relations maneuvers, with no legal
effectiveness.257 Product labeling requires that corporations at-
tach a label to their products certifying that they are made under
acceptable conditions.258 Since they are self-imposed, however, it
can be logically assumed that consumers don’t necessarily have
reason to fully trust these labels, which lessens their value and
effectiveness. If the U.S. government utilizes the power that the
Constitution places in the Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”), it can alleviate these consumer doubts and bolster
consumer confidence.
Section 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, defines a
certification mark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof” owned by one party who certifies the goods
and services of others when they meet certain standards—the
owner of the mark exercises control over the use of the mark be-
cause the sole purpose of a certification mark is to indicate that
certain standards have been met.259 Therefore, the U.S. govern-
ment must create, and register, a specific certification mark that
is designed to differentiate apparel from factories that meet the
standards of the Accord, or similar requisite standards, from ap-
parel that does not. Gradations of adherence might warrant dif-
254. Id.
255. Revak, supra note 182, at 1646.
256. Liubicic, supra note 183, at 113.
257. Revak, supra note 182, at 1646.
258. Liubicic, supra note 183, at 112-13.
259. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Frequently Asked Questions about Trade-
marks, USPTO.gov, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp#_Toc275426676
(last modified April 23, 2013).
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ferent trademarks. Such a scheme allows brands that seek ex-
emplary compliance to reap higher rewards by rising to the bar
set by the Accord. Moreover, this system would also serve as a
new method of advertisement for brands that are proud to meet
high standards.
In fact, an independent certifying organization called Blue
Sign effectively does precisely this, in order to protect the envi-
ronment.260 Founded in Switzerland in 2000, Blue Sign attempts
to utilize a certification mark system in order to “link chemicals
suppliers, textile manufacturers, and brands together to foster a
healthy, responsible, and profitable textile industry.” 261 Cur-
rently, certified textiles are awarded two bluesign® labels:
bluesign® product and bluesign® approved fabric, which differ
in the level and the quantity of their manufacturing ingredi-
ents.262
An American example of a similar certification263 is Made in
USA Certified®, which is the leading non-partisan, independent
certification company for the “Made in USA,” “Product of USA”
and “Service in USA” marks.264 The USA-C™ seals certify that
a company bearing the marks has passed an arduous supply
chain inspection to confirm compliance with American laws and
260. Vision, BLUE SIGN, http://www.bluesign.com/industry/bluesign-technol-
ogies/vision#.UsBq2JSxNvY (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
261. Id.
262. How to Find it, BLUE SIGN, http://www.bluesign.com/consumer/la-
bel#.UsC6d5SxNvY (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
263. Additional international examples include Hong Kong’s Green Label
Scheme, which recognizes that “[i]ncreasing global environmental awareness
has created a demand for, and the supply of, green products.” Green Label
Scheme, GREEN COUNSEL, http://www.greencouncil.org/eng/greenlabel/in-
tro.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Europe’s The Water Label, which certifies
“[b]athroom manufacturers across the globe are aiding governments in their
quest to reduce water consumption . . .” The Label, WATER LABEL,
http://www.europeanwaterlabel.eu/thelabel.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 204); as
well as numerous European Union schemes that cover windows, refrigerators,
dishwashers, washing machines, light bulbs and other energy-consuming ap-
pliances. See Pete Harrison and Davin Brunnstrom, EU’s Eco-labeling Scheme
to Tackle More Products, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/2009/11/17/us-eu-energy-labels-idUSTRE5AG3WJ20091117.
264. Brenda K. Huffman, Can You Believe That “Made in America” Label?,
BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 29, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/are-made-in-
america-claims-always-honest-and-true-2011-9#ixzz2qnyzUKKN.
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regulations while providing consumers with a recognizable sym-
bol that can be trusted.265 An initiative counter to the action that
this Note proposes is the recent movement of consumers toward
domestically made clothes. 266 This movement toward locally
manufactured clothing shows that some Americans’ buying de-
cisions are influenced by the origin of the product. If the U.S.
government issued certifications for clothing imported from
Bangladesh—and, if successful, eventually from all importing
states—consumers would be armed with the information neces-
sary to make knowledgeable decisions with confidence. With
time, these trademarks would become part of the overall buying
experience. As a result, brands would be pressured to meet this
standard in order to gain, or retain, the stamp of approval.
C. Step Three: Purge the U.S. Market of Blood Stained RMG
Entirely
Should the certification system not provide ample incentive for
brands, or even fail to influence consumers’ buying decisions, the
ultimate way to rid the market of these goods lies with the U.S.
government. It must pass legislation to prohibit imported goods
that are made under unacceptable conditions. The U.S. CBP per-
forms three crucial roles in facilitating trade to and from the
United States, and around the world. CBP secures trade from
acts of terrorism, ensures that arriving goods are legitimate, and
that appropriate duties and fees are paid.267 While this Note
does not argue that these Bangladeshi factories are linked to
acts of terrorism, terror is sewn deep into these garments.
Whether it is the fear workers face as they are forced to enter
unsafe factories, or the thousands that are left without mothers,
daughters, or sisters, terror plagues the RMG industry. There-
fore, the United States must take a stand to eliminate this terror
from its sphere altogether. The ultimate power behind such a
movement, however, lies in the hands of American leaders to
spur change.
265. Id.
266. See Amanda Alix, Is the “Made in America” Campaign Really Bringing
Jobs Home?, DAILY-FINANCE (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.dai-
lyfinance.com/2013/12/29/is-the-made-in-america-campaign-really-bringing-
jo/.
267. About CBP, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Nov. 10, 2013),
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/.
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Once the President and lawmakers realize the necessity of a
movement to reform the RMG industry, they must also realize
the power that they have to foster that movement. In fact, the
U.S. government does realize the importance of enacting legisla-
tion that imposes regulations equivalent to the Accord because
the House of Representatives approved a bill requiring all mili-
tary garments made in Bangladesh to come from factories that
either join or abide by the conditions of the Accord on June 14,
2013.268 Unfortunately, the Senate thwarted the garment bill,
based on a provision in the most recent military spending bill,
which would have given preferential treatment to stores on mil-
itary bases that signed the Accord.269 The measure, which had
been incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act,
was ultimately left out of the version that was presented to Pres-
ident Obama.
In a joint letter to the Senate and House Armed Services Com-
mittees, some of the largest retail and clothing lobbies in the
United States took a patriotic tack in their argument against
the provision—a strategy that would ultimately prove effective
on the Hill. They claimed that endorsing the “European” accord
in such a way would undermine the primarily “American” alli-
ance that shared the same concerns in Bangladesh.270
While the Initiative and the Accord may share the same com-
mitment,271 the efforts and the standards which they impose are
quite disparate.272 If it becomes illegal to import goods from
countries like Bangladesh without providing documented proof
that the goods are produced under sufficient standards or certi-
fications—like those the Initiative attempts to set forth—U.S.
companies that are hesitant to join the Accord, or implement
similar binding provisions, will simply be unable to get their
268. Press Release, Committee on Educ. & Workforce Democrats, House Ap-
proves Bill Containing Amendment Regarding Bangladesh Safety Accord and
Military-Branded & Licensed Apparel (June 14, 2013) (available at http://dem-
ocrats.edworkforce.house.gov/press-release/house-approves-bill-containing-
amendment-regarding-bangladesh-safety-accord-and.).
269. Dave Jamieson, How A Plan to Help Curb Garment Factory Disasters in
Bangladesh Died in the U.S. Senate, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/04/rana-plaza-bangladesh-sen-
ate_n_4538747.html.
270. Id.
271. See supra sections IIIB and IIIC.
272. Id.
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products to the U.S. market. This embargo will function just as
the current prohibition on counterfeit trademarked goods. 273
The inability to sell products in the U.S. market will provide
manufacturers and retailers with the incentive to take action. If
vendors are unable to get their goods into the market, they will
be forced to take a more proactive stance. While this will cer-
tainly cost additional funds to implement, and must take place
gradually, it is likely that brands will comply in order to avoid
losing U.S. sales. To bolster the possibility of this option, the
Federal Trade Commission amended its Textile Labeling Rules
in March, 2014, in order to address, among other topics, country-
of-origin disclosures.274 These amendments to the labeling rules
prove that the Commission has the power to implement change,
should it make the choice.275
Should brands choose to simply pull their production from
countries like Bangladesh, or even threaten to do so, the Bang-
ladeshi government, as well as the owners of the factories, will
voluntarily increase their safety standards. After the incident at
Rana Plaza, Bangladeshi leaders begged buyers to avoid harsh
measures in order to protect their economy. Mahbub Ahmed, the
top civil servant in Bangladesh’s Commerce Ministry, has noted
that “[i]f the EU or any other buyers impose any harsh trade
conditions on Bangladesh it will hurt the country’s economy . . .
millions of workers will lose their jobs.”276 Again, the RMG in-
dustry accounts for 80 percent of Bangladesh’s annual exports,
15 percent of its GDP, and 45 percent of all industrial employ-
ment in the country.277 In short, Bangladesh does not want to
273. A recent investigative report, however, alleges that this may not be as
effective since “plenty of federal agencies don’t practice what American officials
have been preaching when it comes to the ethical sourcing of clothing. Several
facilities from which the U.S. government has purchased garments on the
cheap have been complicit in labor abuses discovered in workplace audits.” See
Jamieson, supra note 264; see also Ian Urbina, U.S. Flouts its Own Advice in
Procuring Overseas Clothing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/12/23/world/americas/buying-overseas-clothing-us-flouts-its-
own-advice.html?ref=ianurbina&_r=1&.
274. FTC Issues Changes to Textile Labeling Rules, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(March 14, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/03/ftc-
issues-changes-textile-labeling-rules.
275. See Id.
276. Paul and Quadir, supra note 11.
277. See Md. Mazedul Islam, Adnan Maroof Khan and Md. Monirul Islam,
supra note 53 at 31.
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lose the United States as a business partner, nor should it have
to, if the plan recommended in this Note is implemented.
CONCLUSION
Members of Bangladesh’s RMG industry, divided by the very
garments that they sew, face a difficult situation. To remain
competitive, they seek to cut corners. These corners, however,
have repeatedly led to injury and death. Once the United States
recognizes how deadly the industry currently is, as well as the
fact that the U.S. market holds the key to change the practices
utilized for at least 25 percent of Bangladesh’s output, the
United States must also seize that opportunity to create change.
If it implements the recommended three-pronged approach, the
U.S. government will have the ability to enact realistic and ef-
fective resolutions to counteract the abuses occurring within the
Bangladeshi RMG industry, with even the most limited of re-
sources. It is time to rid America of its bloodstained garments—
and to acknowledge the actual high price of cheap clothing.
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